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## The need for new security architecture in Europe

**SUMMARY** The paper discusses Russia's position towards present day escalation of tensions in international relations and international security which may lead to the new conflict in Europe. It analyses and evaluates Russian proposals, positions and deals with the negotiations between Russia and USA that have taken place in this regard. The paper summarizes the historical facts that led to today's escalation of tensions between Russia, the USA and Europe, and underlines the fact that dialogue requires two parties willing to listen to each other, capable of perception, which must approach it without prejudice and hegemonic, neo-colonial superiority. The paper is based on the assumption that the security architecture of 20<sup>th</sup> century Europe has collapsed and disappeared. Russia is coming up with proposals to re-define it, but the West is unable to do so because of neo-colonial superiority and arrogance and refuses to discuss it, blindly adhering to the status quo of the Cold War. That is the reason why even the Member States of the EU are not able to create real common security policy. But Europe and the world need new security architecture.

**KEYWORDS** peace, international security, security guarantees, Russia, USA, new security architecture, 21<sup>st</sup> century

### Introduction

The current international security situation verifies Hans Morgenthau's (1985) old assertions that law of stronger always applies to international relations. International relations are not about friendship and cooperation, after all it was Lord Palmerston (1848) who said the famous words that “[we] have not eternal allies and [we] have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual and these interests it is our duty to follow“. International relations are not

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even about equality and justice, the protection of the weaker and the universality of law and fundamental freedoms. Morality does not apply here, “universal moral principles... must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place” (Morgenthau, 1985, pp. 7–8), just power is important; “the essence of international politics is identical with its domestic counterpart. Both domestic and international politics are a struggle for power” (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 32). And the only way how to secure it, is to use any means for it<sup>2</sup>. It is a consequence of anarchy in international relations where there is no central or superior authority over the state. States must take into account a lot of variables such as predictions, security dilemmas, perception and misperception, correlation of forces<sup>3</sup> by decision-making process, especially in crisis response.

Therefore, after the Second World War, security architecture was created, consisting of written international law in the form of a network of international treaties and a network of international organizations as platforms for resolving disputes between states. This system has been supplemented by liberalism since 1989, which has dominated the Western practice of international relations till now<sup>4</sup>, at least in appearance. The US and European officials believed that liberal democracy, open markets, the rule of law, universal human rights and other liberal values can spread like wildfire and a global liberal order lies within reach (Fukuyama, 1992). They assumed that the cynical calculus of pure power politics has no place in the modern world and an emerging liberal order would concentrate on getting rich in an increasingly open, harmonious, rules-based liberal order, one shaped and guarded by the benevolent power of the United States (Doyle, 2011; Fukuyama, 1992; Krejčí, 2001; Walt, 2022). Such an approach has divided the world into „good states”, those that adore liberal values and „bad states”, all others, and is based on the premise that conflicts arise primarily from the aggressive impulses of autocrats, dictators and other illiberal leaders. For

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<sup>2</sup> What, of course, Nicollo Machavelli did not mean by his famous work *The Prince*. What he wrote, was „*si guarda al fine*” – that in decisions and actions the prince should look for or anticipate consequences – wise counsel it would seem but by no means an assertion that the end justifies any means as he has customarily been interpreted.

<sup>3</sup> Correlation of forces – the relationship between the sum of economic, political, legal, diplomatic and military relations and interrelationships between nations, states and state institutions, and between the main social, economic and political forces and organizations operating in the world (Guzzini, 1998, p. 105).

<sup>4</sup> Harvard University Professor Stanley Hoffman claimed in 1993 that realism is “utter nonsense today”. (Friedman, 1993) Liberalism sees the world politics differently as realism. Realism sees all great powers as facing more or less the same problem – the need to be secure in a world where war is always possible. Liberalism maintains that what states do is driven mostly by their internal characteristics and the nature of the connections among them (Krejčí, 2001).

liberals, the solution is to overthrow tyrants and spread democracy, markets and institutions on the belief that democracies are not fighting each other, especially if they are united by trade, investment and an agreed set of rules (Doyle, 2011; Fukuyama, 1996; Krejčí, 2001).

In addition to the realist approach, Samuel Huntington (1996) also warned against such an approach, arguing that the widespread Western belief in the universality of Western values and political systems is naive and that the continuing insistence on democratization and such „universal” norms would only further antagonize other civilizations. He identified a major shift in economic, military and political power from the West to other civilizations of the world, especially what he calls the two „demanding civilizations”, Sinic and Islam (Huntington, 1996).

The West has been committed to this approach as the only correct and acceptable one for more than 30 years, but this arrogance and superiority do not suit everyone, and today we see changes in the system, as not only Huntington predicted. Such an approach does not recognize that someone else has their own interests, has a lifestyle confirmed by traditions, history and culture, that someone else has the right to their own attitude and space to develop independently. For the West, Russia has become the enemy that must be punished and forced to be set on the right path.

With this in mind, the following lines will discuss Russia's perspective on the escalation of collective West-East relations. It is based on the assumption that the collective West is deaf and blind to calls for cooperation, what caused the collapse of the European security architecture, which began in the 1990s after an unprecedented NATO attack on a sovereign state, a member of the United Nations. What prevents the West from resolving the conflict peacefully, as envisaged by the UN Charter, is its sense of neo-colonial superiority and Anglo-Saxon arrogance, reinforced by the sense of a false, fictitious victory over the USSR in the Cold War, which is warned against by e.g. Samuel Huntington, John Mearsheimer or Oskar Krejčí. That is why Europe and the world is facing the challenge of creating a new security architecture in which Russia will be a partner, as Angela Merkel also recently stated. Through a historical perspective, a summarization of historical facts and based mainly on the analysis and interpretation of the works of Oskar Krejčí, Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, the essay will follow the Russian view of its security position within Europe.

## Changes in European security architecture

The current security architecture arose from the ashes of the Second World War, as was stated before, and it was fundamentally changed after the coups in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 90s. Unilateralism prevailed in international relations, but as Fareed Zakaria wrote in 2019 “sometime in the last two years, American hegemony has died. The age of American domination was a short, heady era, about three decades, marked by two moments of different kinds. It was born at the time of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The end or real beginning of the end was another collapse – the Iraqi in 2003 and the slow disintegration after it” (Zakaria, 2019, p. 10). So, the security architecture of the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century, based on unilateralism, has definitely disappeared. Rather, we are talking today about widening unstable multilateralism or multipolarity (Hiro, 2009) with US withdrawing from the position of hegemon (Jarvis & Gavin & Rovner & Labrosse, 2018; Layne, 2006, pp. 7–14; McCoy, 2017; Nye, 2015; Peters, 2019) but who does not want to admit the reality. The erosion of this system has begun with reunification of Germany, after which the Yalta agreement from 1945 ceased to apply and when the oral promises of non-enlargement of NATO to Eastern Europe were not kept, which Western politicians, namely U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, leaders of France and Great Britain, gave to Soviet leader Michail Gorbachev and minister of foreign affairs Eduard Shevardnadze<sup>5</sup> (*NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard*, 2017; Shiffrinson Itzkowitz, 2016; Walt, 2022).

After the collapse of former Yugoslavia and disintegration of Czechoslovakia the remnants of the 1918 Versailles Accords ceased to apply as well. In addition, when the independence of Kosovo was recognized by most of the Western states, the Helsinki Protocol<sup>6</sup>, which governed East-West relations since 1975, ceased

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<sup>5</sup> Every enlargement of NATO was at odds with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s verbal assurance to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in February 1990 that if Germany were allowed to reunify within NATO then the alliance would not move “one inch eastward” – a pledge M. Gorbachev foolishly failed to codify in writing. Baker and others dispute this characterization, and Baker has denied that he made any formal pledges (Walt, 2022).

<sup>6</sup> In Helsinki Protocol, the right to autonomy and self-determination was granted to the federal state, state as a whole and to the federal republics, but not to autonomous regions such as Kosovo. Kosovo is therefore a precedent for south of Slovakia, the Basque region, South Ossetia, Abkhazia or Transnistria.

to apply. The whole system of old security architecture received the final blow when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, what was a decision that showed a certain wilful disregard for international law, and even more after the Obama administration exceeded the authority of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and helped oust Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011<sup>7</sup>, not to mention aggression towards Syria later on.

After 77 years of relative peace in Europe, some circles began to roar again with weapons. There is war rhetoric in the media and speeches of politicians. They threaten to use force, even to use nuclear weapons. Today's Sarajevo became the Ukraine.

Although the whole system began to collapse as early as the 90s, it was only accelerated by the Bush administration's decision to nominate Georgia and Ukraine for NATO membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit and even more by the events in Kiev's Euromaidan in 2014, where an unconstitutional coup d'état took place. US officials – especially “fuck the EU” Victoria Nuland<sup>8</sup>, offering cookies to protesters (*The Guardian*, 2014) – have visibly favored the demonstrators and actively participated in the effort to select a successor to the legal and legitimate president (BBC, 2014), who is still in power, thereby lending credibility to Russia's fears that this is a color revolution supported by the West. (Mearsheimer, 2014) This led to instability in Ukraine, the burning of Russian-speaking innocent people in Odessa, the secession of Crimea and its return to Russia, the civil war in eastern Ukraine – in the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, plunging the country into a frozen conflict that persists to this day (January 2022).

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<sup>7</sup> Russia had abstained on the resolution, which authorized protecting civilians but not regime change at that time. The former U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates later commented that “the Russians felt they had been played for suckers.” (Baker, 2013). These and other incidents explain today, why Moscow is now insisting on written guarantees.

<sup>8</sup> Victoria Nuland – the U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, estimated in December 2013 that the United States had invested more than \$5 billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves.” As part of that effort, the U.S. government has bankrolled the National Endowment for Democracy. The non-profit foundation has funded more than 60 projects aimed at promoting civil society in Ukraine, and the NED's president, Carl Gershman, has called that country “the biggest prize.” (Mearsheimer, 2014).

## How Russia sees it

The current Russian Federation faces the fact that on each outer tip of the classical geopolitical vectors are US bases or fleets and United States military allies. At the same time, in the so-called near abroad, in the post-Soviet space, some states have a common past but are hostile to contemporary Russia, or have to face hybrid wars and color revolutions. Simultaneously, Russia had to restore the balance of strategic weapons and modernize its armaments and troops so that everything corresponded to the new phase of the scientific and technological revolution. The core of Russian security lies in the open space of the Eastern European Plain, which makes it impossible to define an advantageous permanent defensive line. That is why Russia's borders were so unstable at first. Outside the Northern regions, all other borders posed almost no natural barrier to external threat. This was also strategically related to the relocation of the capital from the edge of the empire deep into the interior – from St. Petersburg to Moscow. In other words, the Russians cannot feel safe if the so-called Dnieper vector is geopolitically cut off from them. At the same time, however, this characteristic of the openness of the territory, where the core of the current Russia is located, suggests that the post-Soviet geopolitical space is a natural area of interest and influence of the Russian Federation<sup>9</sup> (Krejčí, 2017, pp. 22–27; 505–507). That is the reason, unpleasant as it may be, the United States and its allies need to recognize, as Walt (2002) writes “that Ukraine's geopolitical alignment is a vital interest for Russia – one it is willing to use force to defend – and this is not because Putin happens to be a ruthless autocrat with a nostalgic fondness for the old Soviet past”. Russia, after all, has been repeatedly invaded from the West, and several times through the Ukraine. In 19<sup>th</sup> century it was invaded by Napoleon and his army, during the civil war from 1917 to 1922 it was anti-Bolshevik allied forces including some from the United States. Germany invaded Russia twice, leading to the loss of more than 26 million Soviet citizens in World War II. Current NATO infrastructure nearing borders of Russia resulted into demands for security guarantees and reshaping the European security architecture.

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<sup>9</sup> One might argue that the emergence of strategic weapons has diminished the importance of classical geopolitical vectors. This is true, but only in part, because nuclear weapons are practically useless and, unlike NATO, in Moscow, they never considered using them first.

Russia of Vladimir Putin has understood that weakness is not an opportunity for charity in international politics; it is seen as an incentive for predatory practices. Behind the beautiful words about human rights lies the cult of social Darwinism. In 2007, Vladimir Putin drew attention to these phenomena at the Munich Security Conference but he did not meet the understanding of his Western colleagues. The Western politicians, diplomats and journalists have called his speech as the most aggressive speech, the agent's speech, a speech that „did not help the alliance”, the beginning of a new Cold War, that Russia became assertive (Krejčí, 2017, p. 444). But what was so bad, so outrageous in what the Russian president actually said? He openly criticized the unipolar world order led by the United States which is not only unacceptable but impossible in today's world. He has warned against the overuse of military force in international relations, adding that “countries where the death penalty is banned even against murderers and other criminals” easily participate in military operations that are difficult to legitimize. After all, in these conflicts there was mostly a „collective West”. (Putin, 2007) He criticized the United States for failing to respect international law as well as unbridled armaments. He criticized plans to create an US anti-missile umbrella and efforts to strengthen NATO in Afghanistan. He quoted a statement of former NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner from 17 May 1990 that “the fact that we are ready not to deploy NATO troops outside Germany gives the Soviet Union a firm guarantee of security”. “Where are these guarantees?” he asked the audience. (Putin, 2007) At the same time, he still proposed cooperation, dialogue and the elaboration of concrete agreements that would take into account both the interests of Russia and the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance. He continued to call his Western colleagues partners (Putin, 2007).

In order to understand what is wrong in Russia-West relations, we have to go back in time to Paris Conference, which took place on 21 November 1990. There the highest representative of the CSCE states signed the Paris Charter for a New Europe, in which all European states, the Soviet Union, the United States as well as Canada agreed that security is indivisible and that it is not possible to strengthen the security of one at the expense of the other. The creation of exclusive military blocs that set up armaments and confrontation was considered as obsolete and dangerous in an atmosphere of easing international tensions. Politicians such as Mikhail Gorbachev, George Bush Sr., Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand, Margaret Thatcher or Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa signed this commitment. The fulfillment of this document was to ensure the creation

of a safety belt, so called Gorbachev's „common European house from the Atlantic to the Urals”.

This dream never happened<sup>10</sup>. The West abandoned this new philosophy of security very soon, intoxicated by the feeling of victory in the Cold War. Stone by stone West began to dismantle the given security architecture in Europe and trust between the West and Russia. Washington and Brussels are responsible for failing to use the end of the Soviet Union to establish a genuine partnership between Russia and the West. Let's summarize the breaking events leading to an unprecedented increase in mutual mistrust:

1. The United States were the first to deviate from the principles of the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe, in which all European states, including the Soviet Union, but also Canada and the United States, agreed that security was indivisible and that security could not be strengthened at the expense of each other and that the formation of military blocs, escalating armaments and confrontation, is overcome and dangerous as they begin to push NATO enlargement deep into Eastern Europe, breaking the promises made to CPSU Secretary General M. Gorbachev in exchange for German reunification that NATO will never expand. (as was already mentioned above).
2. In 1999, the bombing of Yugoslavia – Belgrade and the rest of Serbia – by NATO aircraft.
3. Two major waves of NATO enlargement to the east in 1999 and 2004. Prior to NATO enlargement George Kennan predicted in 1997 that “expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking ...” (Kennan, 1997).
4. In 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from *the Anti-Ballistic Missile System Treaty*, also known as *the Missile Defence Treaty* (ABM).

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<sup>10</sup> Not only Michail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin after him, but also Vladimir Putin hoped to build an international community with the West which would prioritize cooperation between equal partners, instead of formation of antagonist blocs. He mentions this offer every time he meets his western counterparts. He even proposed Russia's membership in NATO, shortly after coming to power. West took it as a joke (Kotlikoff, 2022).



5. The Bush administration's decision to nominate Georgia and Ukraine for NATO membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. As former U.S. National Security Council official Fiona Hill recently revealed, the U.S. intelligence community opposed this step but then U.S. President George W. Bush ignored its objections for reasons that have never been fully explained. (Erlanger, 2021) Even some NATO members (France and Germany) opposed this decision. The outcome was unpleasant compromise brokered by British representatives where NATO declared that both states would eventually join but did not say when<sup>11</sup>.
6. The overthrow of the democratically elected Ukrainian president in February 2014 under the leadership of US officials in Ukraine. (See above).
7. In 2017, the US unilaterally withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement.
8. The US withdrew from UNESCO in 2018, the WHO (World Health Organization) in 2020 and is threatening to leave other international organizations.
9. On 8 May 2018, the United States unilaterally withdrew from a hard-won agreement to limit Iran's nuclear program between Iran, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the EU, China, Russia, and the United States, officially called the *The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action*.
10. The US withdrew from *the Short – and Medium-Range Missile Treaty* (INF) in 2019.
11. In 2020, the US announced its intention to withdraw unilaterally from *the Open Skies Treaty*<sup>12</sup>.
12. The US has engaged in military aggression, some under the NATO banner, in violation of international law and without a UN Security Council mandate, against the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

In Russia, the period of self-destruction and simple notions of liberal solidarity seems to have ended, and the search for real support for the national interest has begun. Ensuring information sovereignty has become the starting point.

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<sup>11</sup> Political scientist Samuel Charap stated in this case: “[T]his declaration was the worst of all worlds. It provided no increased security to Ukraine and Georgia, but reinforced Moscow’s view that NATO was set on incorporating them.” (Charap, 2021) Former U.S. ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder described the 2008 decision as NATO’s “cardinal sin” (Erlanger, 2021).

<sup>12</sup> The Open Skies Treaty entered into force in 2002 and is seen as an important tool for international arms control. It allows one country’s army to conduct a number of unarmed reconnaissance flights over another country. It has been signed by 35 countries around the world. The official withdrawal of the USA took place in November 2020.


The influx of economic sanctions from the „collective West” showed the importance of economic sovereignty. Since 2014, there has been talk that Russia’s ability to carry out a second nuclear strike, i.e. to create a strategic balance with the United States, has been restored. This is not a trivial change (Krejčí, 2017). After all these events, Russia has have learned to talk to those who have their finger on the trigger; the United States taught them that.

In international relations, if a country decides to unite with its neighbour’s main rival, then it is logical that that neighbour will consider such an alliance a threat to its security. And if the country in question builds close military ties with this rival, then this neighbour will consider it an even greater threat. And this is exactly how Moscow looks at intensifying military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO and NATO activities close to its borders. It sees this:

1. In the group of American troops on German territory, the fire attack command was renewed, which provides for various systems of strike missiles.
2. Infrastructure for the deployment of the US Armoured Brigade is being set up in Poland and the Aegis Ashore anti-missile complex is being completed.
3. In Romania, such a missile defence device is already on standby.
4. NATO, led by the United States, is targeting an increase in the scope and intensity of exercises near Russia, increasingly involving the Strategic Air Force and conducting nuclear-missile training at Russian facilities. The number of their flights near the Russian border has more than doubled.
5. There are 8,000 US troops deployed in Eastern European countries and their numbers are increasing.
6. NATO troops are based in Baltic states, doing exercises 200 m from the Russian border.
7. Tensions are rising not only on the western but also on the eastern borders of the Russian Federation. Russia and China have protested sharply against the deployment of US medium-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing has even reaffirmed and warned that NATO must abandon ideological prejudices and make greater efforts to promote international security. Moscow’s proposal for security guarantees has been identified in Beijing as a step that can help resume dialogue and increase global security.
8. Moscow carefully watches how the results of World War II results as well as the role and victory of the Red Army in it are questioned in Europe what

leads to the removal and demolition of memorials dedicated to the celebration of victory over fascism and cemeteries dedicated to the fallen soldiers of Red Army in Central and Eastern Europe. It also sensitively monitors the official celebrations, glorification and honour of domestic fascists (Bandera) and fascist groups (SS Galizien) in Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia without an adequate and appropriate response from the European Union, NATO or other human rights organizations.

9. Russia also follows the expanding Russophobia across Europe, manifested by various bans for Russian athletes up to the loss of employment and bullying citizens of Russian nationality. In the 1930s it was a Jew; today it is a Russian and everything that comes from Russia.
10. NATO's military spending as a whole exceeds 18 times the Russian spending, US military spending exceeds 12 times the Russian, the European part of NATO invests 5 times more in armaments than Russia (Graph 1).



Graph 1. Military spending in 2020 in billions of USD

Sources: Da Silva, Tian & Marksteiner, 2021.

Relations between Russia and the West have long been characterised by a lack of mutual trust. On 17 December 2021, Moscow proposed security assurance treaties with the United States and NATO in which it frankly and clearly outlined its concepts for the strengthening of security near Russia border. As Angela Stent (2022) writes, Kremlin demands that Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries

as well as Sweden and Finland commit to permanent neutrality and eschew seeking NATO membership. NATO would have to retreat to its 1997 military posture, before its first enlargement, by removing all troops and equipment in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia would also have veto power over the foreign policy of its non-NATO neighbours (Stent, 2022). She calls these demands the Putin doctrine, the core element of which is “getting the West to treat Russia as if it were the Soviet Union, a power to be respected and feared with special rights in its neighbourhood and a voice in every serious international matter” (Stent, 2022).

Russia’s interests are as legitimate as those of the West’s and till now the United States and Europe have been disregarding them. So the Russia wants to insist on legal treaties which will preclude further NATO enlargement eastwards. Putin emphasized in particular that he would be satisfied only with legal guarantees, a specific document setting out NATO’s commitment not to approach Russia’s borders, and underlined that he did not want the situation to escalate, echoing conciliatory comments by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who said Moscow did not want war. He stressed also that United States and its allies ignored to answer the key question, “how the United States and its allies intend to follow the principle of security integrity, that no one should strengthen their security at the expense of another country’s security” (Soldatkin & Marrow, 2022), as they committed to it in the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe.

It seems that the main issue here is a NATO membership and Russia’s real fears of NATO moving closer to Russia’s borders. As it was mentioned already above, NATO’s repeated insistence that enlargement is an open-ended process and any country meeting the membership criteria is eligible to join was problematic already in the time of its declaration in 2008. Moreover the Article 10 of the NATO treaty merely states: “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” (NATO Treaty) The key word in the analysis of this article is “may”; it means no nation has the right to join NATO and for sure not in case if its accession would make other members less secure. Any military alliance can incorporate new members if the existing parties agree to do so. NATO did it several times but why it rejects to incorporate Russia when there was an interest to join? For example, Laurence Kotlikoff (2022) in his article *Invite Russia to join NATO* recommends to welcome Russia as a NATO member. This act would pledge Russia not to invade Ukraine and to resolve its ongoing disputes

over Crimea and the Donbas. On the other hand, NATO would pledge to defend Russia against attack by foreign powers, including renegade members of NATO. Thus, Russia's joining NATO, at NATO's behest, immediately eliminates the two concerns at hand. Russia will, effectively, agree to settle its dispute with Ukraine peacefully, and the current NATO allies will, effectively, agree to a peace treaty with Russia. Indeed, a treaty in which they are sworn to its defense, including its defense against attack by a subset of the alliance. (Kotlikoff, 2022).

On the other hand, Michael Kimmage (2022) preaches to close the door of NATO, but not in order to please Putin who is trying to use the threat of a wider war in Ukraine to force neutrality on that country and to halt the alliance expansion. But for its own good. In his view, "the alliance is already overextended in one of the world's most dangerous neighborhoods, incorporating Ukraine would be strategic madness" because "the defense alliance is unequipped to handle a conflict between a non-member seeking membership and a nuclear power hell-bent on denying that membership." This is a conflict that NATO can only lose and that can even jeopardize the existence of an alliance if a member state as Poland or Lithuania is involved in the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. Kimmage believes that the United States and its European allies and partners at the same time should propose a new negotiating institution with Russia, focusing on crisis management, deconflict and strategic dialogue. NATO should not play a role in this (Kimmage, 2022).

After seventy-seven years of relative peace and tranquility in Europe, we can once again hear the rumble of weapons and aggressive militaristic rhetoric and propaganda. Words of peace and cooperation disappeared in this cry. Reason was silenced, passions prevailed. The enemy has been found. It is the same as usual so many times in history – Russia. Paradoxically, mostly this rhetoric comes from the countries most affected by previous wars – the states of Eastern Europe from the Baltic, Warsaw to Prague, the states liberated by the Red Army from fascism. Europe has become tight for them. They want to please an overseas hegemon in decline, who is too far away, whose interest is not their well-being and protection, but only his power. He is their hegemon, they are his vassals. NATO is no longer enough for them, because it is part of an old security architecture that has long since disappeared and is ill suited to 21<sup>st</sup> century Europe (Kimmage, 2022). There is a time for NATO to close its doors for new members and have to start reshaping itself from the inside. Quoting former German Chancellor Angela Merkel it is necessary to work on new pan-European security architecture in the long term – "also including Russia."

## Conclusions

The answers to the Russian proposals are known by now. There is not outcome and the war finally came to Europe. But it comes not in the form reported by the mainstream media and secret services. The attack began on the morning of February 24, 2022; six days after Ukrainian President Zelensky begged collective West for the nuclear weapons at a Munich security conference to use them against Crimea, Donbas and Luhansk. Tons of weapons are pouring into Ukraine following the decision of the new EU member states from Eastern Europe, a new round of armaments is launched, most mainstream politicians and mainstream media together with their chosen experts and artists are jointly shifting publicly shared values to blindly call to arms, to celebrate the only one truth, to attack not against the war, not for peace, but against ethnicities. The hard-won traditions of humanism are being replaced by militant attitudes based on crowd behaviour and joyful competition in devotion to new flags and protectors...

The EU itself has lost its core and fundamental value – peace. It is not more calling for peace and peaceful solutions. Instead of calling for diplomacy, negotiations and ending the conflict, EU uses the language of sanctions and militarism. For the United States, this is again one of the proxy wars, which, moreover, discredits, at least in the collective West, one of the challengers and reformers of the American-centric world order. And it's cheaper than the war in Afghanistan. Henry Kissinger described it as follows: "... the development of the situation shows that the West has gone from a nebulous goal of integrating Russia into Western society in an effort to destroy it. On this issue, the US has lost its sense of proportion and context. By the way, Washington should address European security issues with Moscow" (Latta, 2015).

Politicians outside the EU sound like the voice of common sense today. Pope Francis (2022) said in the interview for *Corriere della Sera* that "maybe it was NATO barking at Russia's gate" that compelled Putin to unleash the invasion of Ukraine. "I have no way of telling whether his rage has been provoked... but I suspect it was maybe facilitated by the West's attitude". (Fontana, 2022) "In Ukraine, it was other states that created the conflict," without identifying which states. He likened the war to other conflicts that he said were fomented by international interests: "Syria, Yemen, Iraq, one war after another in Africa." (Rocca & Gershkovich, 2022) Even, Brazil leader Lula da Silva (2022) in the exclusive interview for *Time* stated: "Putin shouldn't have invaded Ukraine. But

it's not just Putin who is guilty. The U.S. and the E.U. are also guilty. What was the reason for the Ukraine invasion? NATO? Then the U.S. and Europe should have said: "Ukraine won't join NATO." That would have solved the problem... The conversations were very few. If you want peace, you have to have patience. They could have sat at a negotiating table for 10, 15, 20 days, a whole month, trying to find a solution. I think dialogue only works when it is taken seriously... And now, sometimes I sit and watch the President of Ukraine speaking on television, being applauded, getting a standing ovation by all the [European] parliamentarians. This guy is as responsible as Putin for the war. Because in the war, there's not just one person guilty... And now, this President of Ukraine could have said, "Come on; let's stop talking about this NATO business, about joining the E.U. for a while. Let's discuss a bit more first..." I don't know the President of Ukraine. But his behavior is a bit weird. It seems like he's part of the spectacle. He is on television morning, noon, and night. He is in the U.K. parliament, the German parliament, the French parliament, and the Italian parliament, as if he were waging a political campaign. He should be at the negotiating table... If he didn't want war, he would have negotiated a little more. That's it. I criticized Putin when I was in Mexico City [in March], saying that it was a mistake to invade. But I don't think anyone is trying to help create peace. People are stimulating hate against Putin. That won't solve things! We need to reach an agreement. But people are encouraging [the war]. You are encouraging this guy [Zelensky], and then he thinks he is the cherry on your cake. We should be having a serious conversation: "OK, you were a nice comedian. But let us not make war for you to show up on TV." And we should say to Putin: "You have a lot of weapons, but you don't need to use them on Ukraine. Let's talk!" (Nugent, 2022).

The only way out is to sit and talk, negotiate and talk and listen and negotiate again. Just a dialogue in which everyone will listen and everyone will be heard can help to establish new pan-European security architecture.

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## Potrzeba nowej architektury bezpieczeństwa w Europie

**STRESZCZENIE** W artykule omówiono stanowisko Rosji wobec dzisiejszej eskalacji napięć w stosunkach międzynarodowych i bezpieczeństwie międzynarodowym, które mogą doprowadzić do nowego konfliktu w Europie. Artykuł analizuje i ocenia rosyjskie propozycje, stanowiska i podejmuje kwestię negocjacji między Rosją a USA, które toczyły się w tym zakresie. Artykuł podsumowuje fakty historyczne, które doprowadziły do dzisiejszej eskalacji napięć między Rosją, USA i Europą oraz podkreśla, że dialog wymaga dwóch stron chętnych do wzajemnego słuchania, zdolnych do rozumienia, które muszą podejść do niego bez uprzedzeń i hegemonicznej, neokolonialnej wyższości. Artykuł opiera się na założeniu, że architektura bezpieczeństwa dwudziestowiecznej Europy załamała się i zniknęła. Rosja przedstawia propozycje jej przededefiniowania, ale Zachód nie jest w stanie tego zrobić z powodu neokolonialnej wyższości i arogancji oraz odmawia dyskusji o tym, ślepo trzymając się *status quo* z czasów zimnej wojny. Dlatego nawet państwa członkowskie UE nie są w stanie stworzyć prawdziwej wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa. Ale Europa i świat potrzebują nowej architektury bezpieczeństwa.

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