Radoslav Ivančík[1]
Radoslava Brhlíková[2]

European security and defence in the context of current developments

SUMMARY The continuous deterioration of the global and regional security environment, the deterioration of the security situation in the immediate and distant surroundings of the territory of the European Union and the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine have raised inexorable questions in the member states of the EU about how they should guarantee their security and defence. Although no member state of the EU was attacked militarily, Ukraine – a partner country of the EU, which moreover immediately neighbours several member countries of the EU – was aggressively attacked by Russia, in violation of international law, which de facto calls into question European stability, as well as the European security and defence regime. That is also why the authors of the paper deal with the issue of European security and defence with the aim of pointing out how the Russian invasion of Ukraine influenced European debates on this urgent topic. In this context, they focus on the Common Security and Defence Policy and the security and defence identity of the EU, its relationship with the North Atlantic Alliance and future security challenges.

KEYWORDS European Union, security, defence, current development, and future challenges

---

1 Radoslav Ivančík, doc. Ing., PhD.et PhD., MBA, MSc., docent, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy and Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, e-mail: rivancik@ukf.sk, ORCID: 0000-0003-2233-1014.

2 Radoslava Brhlíková, Mgr., PhD., docent, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy and Political Science, Faculty of Arts, e-mail: rbrhlikova@ukf.sk, ORCID: 0000-0001-5891-4129.

Introduction

The Common Security and Defence Policy (hereinafter referred to as "CSDP") of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as "EU" or "Union") was launched in the late 1990s in close connection with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, as a tool enabling the EU to carry out crisis management similar to in the way that the North Atlantic Alliance (hereinafter referred to as "NATO" or "Alliance") did at that time in Bosnia and Herzegovina and then in Kosovo (Brhlíková, 2013; 2014; Ivančík, 2021; 2022a). Since 2003, the EU has started to carry out its own military and civilian operations and missions within CSDP, especially in the Western Balkans, the Middle East and Africa (Ivančík & Jurčák, 2023). In this way, CSDP has established itself as one of the basic components of the European security architecture. The EU has never conducted combat military operations like NATO or some of its member states. As a rule, it involved the fulfilment of tasks ranging from crisis management, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, through joint disarmament operations, training missions and tasks of military advice and assistance, to humanitarian, rescue and post-conflict stabilization tasks (Jurčák & Ivančík, 2023). Since 2003, the Union has led 37 operations and missions on three continents. Currently, 21 operations and missions are conducted under the banner of the EU, within CSDP, of which 12 are civilian and 9 are military (EEAS, 2024a). These activities have played a key role in shaping the EU's security identity, although their success has been questioned from the start, and the political support these operations have had from EU member states has not always been certain. The problem was mainly that the conduct of military operations and missions within CSDP was not accompanied by concurrent efforts to develop European military capabilities and capacities. In addition, the European defence market remained fragmented and the Member States of the Union did very little to facilitate the joint development of defence capabilities and capacities and in favour of joint procurement (EDA, 2023). This is also why a series of initiatives were taken within the framework of the implementation of the *EU Global Strategy for Security and Defence* (hereinafter referred to as the "Global Strategy") from 2016 (EEAS, 2016), including the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (hereinafter referred to as "PESCO") in December 2017 (EC, 2017a) and the European Defence Fund (hereafter "EDF") in June 2017 (EC, 2017b). Through this effort, the EU focused on addressing the structural deficiencies of the European Defence Industrial

Base at a time when there was less demand for CSDP operations and missions. The aforementioned initiatives led to the creation of 60 PESCO projects in 7 areas, while EDF financed defence industry projects totalling 1.2 billion Euros (EC, 2022). Through these initiatives, the EU's defence agenda has shifted from operations and missions to greater development of military capabilities. This development was captured by the *Strategic Compass for Security and Defence*, which was drawn up before the conflict in Ukraine but was not adopted until the end of March 2022. It is a document that provides a joint assessment of the strategic environment in which the EU operates and the threats and challenges it faces. Union faces. At the same time, it proposes a series of initiatives to improve the EU's ability to act decisively during crises and defend its security and its citizens. Among other things, it also proposes the creation of a rapid deployment capability of up to 5,000 troops for crisis management operations (EEAS, 2022).

Security and defense identity of the EU

The way the EU responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 confirmed its existence as a purposeful security actor (Dijkstra, 2022). By adopting twelve packages of sanctions against Russia so far (EC, 2024a), more than 4 million Ukrainian refugees and related humanitarian aid, financing the supply of arms to Ukraine and responding to the energy crisis, the Union has played a significant role in the overall Western response to the return of high-intensity conflict to European continent. The relative ease, with which decisions were taken, especially during the first year of the war, also testified to a sense of political cohesion among EU states and their unification in sharing outrage over Russian aggression against Ukraine. Political unity at the level of the Union culminated when it offered Ukraine (together with Moldova) the status of a candidate country at the European summit in June 2022. The EU member states thereby showed that they are willing to support Ukraine not only politically and economically, but also with the supply of weapons, while refraining from taking measures that could lead to a direct confrontation with Russia. Still, some differences were generally seen, particularly in how far European states are willing to go in supporting Ukraine, with France and Germany sometimes seen as less willing to supply high-end lethal weapons compared to Poland and the Baltic states, which are from a territorial point of view, much more exposed to the Russian threat (Ricard et al., 2022). Discussions were held especially when deciding on the delivery of battle tanks at the beginning of 2023, when Germany and

France resisted the decision to send Leopard 2 and Leclerc tanks to Ukraine. Germany eventually agreed to supply Leopard 2 heavy battle tanks to the Ukrainian armed forces, while France only sent AMX-10RC light wheeled tanks (Schmitz et al., 2023). In connection with the conflict in Ukraine, the EU established a CSDP military mission (EU Military Assistance Mission – EUMAM) in October 2022, the task of which is to train 15,000 (later the number increased to 30,000) Ukrainian soldiers (EC, 2022). The training takes place in Poland and Germany, with the participation of several EU states (EEAS, 2024b). Finally, while many political and scholarly discussions before 24 February 2022 were dominated by the low level of defense spending by most EU member states and how this negatively affects transatlantic ties (Ellyatt, 2018; Hennigan, 2018), the Russian invasion of Ukraine she was a wake-up call for many of them. Most governments of European member states have updated their previous threat assessments and taken decisions to strengthen their defense capabilities and capacities and increase defense spending (Davidson, 2023). Additionally, Finland and Sweden joined NATO (Chatterjee, 2023).

Some selected aspects of the security and defence policy of the EU in the context of the war in Ukraine

One of the visible aspects of the Union's security and defence policy in the context of the war in Ukraine is that the EU and its Member States did not hesitate, but really and decisively acted in the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine, demonstrating a sense of relevance at a strategic moment in the EU's existence. European institutions have taken a clear geopolitical approach, using a combination of short-term and long-term elements and tools of the extended security agenda in the form of sanctions packages, arms supplies, financial and humanitarian aid, etc.). Another visible aspect of the Union's security and defence policy is the above-mentioned EUMAM training mission, which confirms the geopolitical dimension of the EU, as through this mission the EU trains members of the Ukrainian armed forces fighting against Russia. Although EU member states do not wish to engage in direct military confrontation with Russia, the training of Ukrainian forces is probably not completely politically neutral (Novaky, 2023). At the same time, it testifies to the reality of CSDP, in contrast to what was done, or rather, it did not in response to the war in the Balkans in the 1990s, the war in Iraq in 2003, the Arab Spring or the Libyan crisis in 2011. As a third aspect, it can be mentioned that the activities developed after February

24, 2022 are more like taking a general security and support position than taking a real defensive position. The EU's response so far has been more about funding, sanctions, coordination and training than directly contributing to the defence of its member states on the eastern flank. For example, the Union as such did not contribute at all to the enhanced forward presence (HQALC, 2024) led by NATO deployed on the territory of the eight countries of the eastern flank (NATO, 2023), nor was there any discussion about possible security guarantees that the EU would provide to Ukraine or Finland and Sweden with referring to Article 42.7 of the *EU Treaty on Mutual Assistance* (EÚ, 2012). The fourth aspect that can be mentioned in connection with Russian military aggression is the following. While EU member states have reassessed their defence posture in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, uncertainties exist on at least two levels: one concern the medium-term reality of delivering on the defence efforts promised by current governments; and the second concerns which organization – the Union or the Alliance – will benefit more from the changes. On the first level, one can observe Germany's hesitancy in implementing the promise of allocating defence expenditures in the amount of 2% of GDP and using the fund for the modernization of the army in the amount of 100 billion Euros, which showed how long-term threat perceptions and domestic politics can influence decisions taken immediately after the outbreak of war (Knight, 2023). In terms of the institutional debate, although the war allowed further rapprochement between the EU and NATO along with the clarification of their respective roles (see below), it still did not erase the deep inter-institutional competition that may even be renewed at a time when states want to strengthen their defence positions and may be in the temptation to prioritize NATO over the EU in the area of ensuring its security and defence.

Strategic autonomy in the context of the war in Ukraine

The global strategy adopted in 2016 framed the concept of *EU strategic autonomy*. In its foreword, then-Vice-President of the European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, said that the strategy "supports the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union" as it is considered necessary to advance the common interests of our citizens as well as our principles and values" (EEAS, 2016, p. 4). In the following years, the concept of strategic autonomy developed mainly in the field of security and defense and was implicitly defined in relation

to NATO and the role of the United States of America in ensuring the defense of Europe. In this sense, the strategic autonomy of the EU was understood as the ability to decide, plan and carry out a number of high-level military activities without the Union having to rely on the Alliance or the USA (Ivančík, 2022b). The concept was gradually expanded to include not only the European security and defense policy, but also other policies related to the economy, energy, critical economic elements, etc. In the context of Trump's tenure in the US presidency and the emergence of doubts about the US commitment to European defense, several European leaders have indicated the need for Europeans to unite in the field of security and defense (Zandee et al., 2020). However, the concept of European strategic autonomy created a certain tension between the Union and the United States, because it was perceived as their exclusion from the transatlantic partnership and also as harmful to the Alliance. Several European states did not like the very concept of autonomy because, according to them, it could mean a smaller role for NATO or the USA as the primary guarantors of ensuring Europe's defense or express the will to separate Europe from North America (Anderlini & Caulcutt, 2023). However, given the central role of the US and NATO in the response to the Ukrainian crisis in February 2022, one of the conclusions of this sequence of events was that the debate about European strategic autonomy is no longer relevant. Not only has the US shown itself to be fully committed to the defense of Europe, but the extreme European dependence on the Americans for military capabilities and capabilities, as revealed – or rather confirmed – by the war in Ukraine has also indicated that Europe's ambitions for strategic autonomy are simply beyond reality at the moment (Davidson, 2022). Moreover, in those European countries most exposed to the Russian threat, the alliance with the US and NATO is considered irreplaceable and cannot be undermined by any narrative of a hypothetical European strategic autonomy.

Partnership between the EU and NATO in the context of the war in Ukraine

In connection with the above information, it is necessary to add a few sentences about the partnership between the EU and NATO and its development in the context of the war in Ukraine. Although this partnership has been marked by the existence of an EU CSDP that has not met with great understanding at the level of the Alliance and the United States, in general this partnership has benefited mainly from a number of mutually beneficial initiatives taken

in recent years, in particular from joint negotiations and subsequent statements by EU and NATO top officials from 2016 (NATO, 2016) and 2018 (NATO, 2018). These were aimed at deepening the mutual cooperation between the Union and the Alliance in a spirit of complete openness and transparency and in full respect of the decision-making independence and decision-making procedures of both organizations, as well as on the principles of inclusiveness and reciprocity, without in any way affecting the special nature of the security and defence policy of any member state. In practice, the partnership between the EU and NATO – based on shared values and determination to manage common challenges and on a clear commitment to promote and protect peace, freedom and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic area – has successfully and tangibly developed over the years, whether through political dialogue, coordination between staff or through cooperation in seven strategic areas, which are: hybrid threats, operational cooperation including maritime issues, cyber security, defence capabilities, industry and research, coordinated exercises and capacity building (EC, 2024b). Both organizations demonstrated an adequate level of cooperation even after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. For example, the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence makes extensive reference to NATO (cited 30 times). In it, the EU recognizes how important the Alliance is for the collective defence of its members, and at the same time talks about the EU's complementarity with NATO (EEAS, 2022). Similarly, the new NATO Strategic Concept characterizes the EU (which is cited 11 times in it) as a "unique and indispensable partner for NATO". At the same time, the alliance "recognizes the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, which contributes positively not only to transatlantic but also to global security and is complementary and interoperable with NATO" (NATO, 2022, p. 10). The third EU-NATO joint statement was issued in January 2023. It reaffirms the strength of the partnership and promises renewed cooperation in addressing growing geostrategic competition, challenges of resilience and protection of critical infrastructures, cooperation in the field of disruptive technologies, space, addressing the security consequences of climate change, as well as problems associated with manipulation and foreign interference. Importantly, the war in Ukraine also clarified the division of roles between NATO, which "deterrents and defends" and the EU, which "sanctions and finances" (EC, 2023). The Alliance's defence agenda was thereby strengthened, while the Union's political and security agenda found a new reality in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine. However, the EU–NATO partnership continues to suffer from several inconsistencies linked to national

policies and inherent inter-institutional competitive dynamics. At the first level, some non-EU NATO allies – namely the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey – do not necessarily consider the relationship between the Union and the Alliance a priority or have problems with EU states (such as Turkey and Cyprus) that directly affect the partnership between the EU and NATO. The ambiguity that characterizes France's policy towards NATO, for example in the context of the debate on European strategic autonomy, has also negatively affected the cooperation between the two organizations. At the institutional level, the EU's defence ambitions and NATO's ambitions in areas tangential to the EU's comparative advantages, such as resilience, critical infrastructure protection or cyber security, have also led to some disagreements between the two organizations. These two sets of discrepancies, unfortunately, lead to a sub-optimal partnership between the two organizations, which, even based on them, does not yet reach the level that the current strategic framework (not only in the context of Russian aggression against Ukraine) would require.

Conclusion

In conclusion it can be stated that the EU is quite often portrayed as progressive in times of crisis, and the war in Ukraine can be an example of this. Indeed, through several of its initiatives, implemented after February 24, 2022, the Union has demonstrated a sense of renewed relevance at an important strategic moment of its existence. Some of the measures taken (such as the use of funds from the European Peace Facility (EC, 2024c) for the purchase of lethal weapons and/or measures related to sanctions against Russia and ensuring energy security) needed to be carefully considered in the context of the war in Ukraine. Considering the current development trends in the security sector, it is clear that the Union will continue to face several challenges in the coming months, especially in Ukraine. At least three such challenges will be particularly acute. First, the EU will have to continue to show the highest level of political cohesion towards Russia, which will have an important political dimension (political unity of member states) that will affect the EU's ability to: a) maintain or even strengthen further sanctions against Russia; b) keep up with the supply of arms and financial aid to Ukraine; and c) ensure a united front in any possible negotiations with Russia. Second, the Union will have to reassess any potential discussions on European strategic autonomy and take into account existing transatlantic ties (expressed by EU–US relations) as well as the exclusive partnership between the EU and

NATO. The main theme must be mutual complementarity (complementarity) with an effort to remove the ambiguities caused by some previous statements about strategic autonomy. And thirdly, it will be necessary to develop a clear vision about the role of the Union in the post-Ukrainian situation, about the future European security regime, about the relationship with the Alliance in this regime, about the degree of political and economic integration of Ukraine into the Union before its full accession and about the type of security guarantees, which the EU will be able to offer to Ukraine if it does not (or until it) gains NATO membership.

And finally, it can only be added that what the EU and its member states can offer at these three levels will directly affect the level and quality of ensuring European security and defence. Never in the past have expectations in this area been so high.

References

Anderlini, J., & Caulcutt, C. (2023). Europe must resist pressure to become 'America's followers,' says Macron. *Politico*. https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-china-america-pressure-interview (accessed: 26.11.2025).

Brhlíková, R. (2013). *Politiky Európskej únie po Lisabone*. Nitra: Univerzita Konštantína Filozofa.

Brhlíková, R. (2014). *Bezpečnosť a Európska únia*. Nitra: Univerzita Konštantína Filozofa.

Chatterjee, P. (2023). How Sweden and Finland went from neutral to Nato. *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61397478 (accessed: 29.05.2024).

Davidson, J.W. (2022). European Strategic Autonomy Is Dead. *The National Interest*. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/european-strategic-autonomy-dead-203222 (accessed: 30.05.2024).

Davidson, J. (2023). No 'free-riding' here: European defense spending defies US critics. *The Atlantic Council*. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/no-free-riding-hereeuropean-defense-spending-defies-us-critics (accessed: 29.05.2024).

Dijkstra, H. (2022). The War in Ukraine and Studying the EU as a Security Actor. *JOINT Brief*. https://www.jointproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/joint_b_15.pdf (accessed: 29.05.2024).

EC (2017a). Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States. *European Council*. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D2315 (accessed: 28.05.2024).

EC (2017b). Launching the European Defence Fund. *European Commission*. https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/23605?locale=en (accessed: 28.05.2024).

EC (2022). Defence Industry: EU takes steps to invest almost €1.2 billion to support 61 defence industrial cooperation projects. *European Commission*. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/results-edf-2021-calls-proposals-eu-invests-eu12-billion-61-defence-industrialcooperation-projects-2022-07-20_en (accessed: 28.05.2024).

EC (2023). Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, 10 January 2023. *European Council*. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/10/eu-nato-joint-declaration-10-january-2023 (accessed: 30.05.2024).

EC (2024a). EU sanctions against Russia. *European Council*. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia (accessed: 28.05.2024).

EC (2024b). Spolupráca EÚ a NATO. *European Council*. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/sk/policies/defence-security/eu-nato-cooperation (accessed: 30.05.2024).

EC (2024c). European Peace Facility. *European Council*. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility (accessed: 31.05.2024).

EDA (2022). Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). *European Defence Agency*. https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/permanent-structured-cooperation-(PESCO) (accessed: 28.05.2024).

EDA (2023). 2022 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence Report. *European Defence Agency*. https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-publications/2022-card-report.pdf (accessed: 28.05.2024).

EEAS (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy. *European Union External Action Service*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf (accessed: 28.05.2024).

EEAS (2022). Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. *European Union External Action Service*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en (accessed: 28.05.2024).

EEAS (2024a). EU Missions and Operations. *European Union External Action Service*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en (accessed: 28.05.2024).

EEAS (2024b). EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine. *European External Action Service*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eumam-ukraine_en?s=410260 (accessed: 29.05.2024).

Ellyatt, H. (2018). Trump's NATO criticism is 'valid,' Europe isn't spending enough on defense, UK ex-minister says. *CNBC*. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/11/trumps-nato-criticism-is-valid-europe-isnt-spending-enough-on-def.html (accessed: 29.05.2024).

EÚ (2012). Zmluva o Európskej únii (Konsolidované znenie). *Úradný vestník Európskej únie*. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0011.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (accessed: 30.05.2024).

Hennigan, W.J. (2018). President Trump Says NATO Allies Owe the U.S. Money. He's Wrong. *TIME*. https://time.com/5335111/donald-trump-nato-spending-facts (accessed: 29.05.2024).

HQALC (2024). JEnhanced Forward Presence (eFP). *HQ Allied Land Command*. https://lc.nato.int/operations/enhanced-forward-presence-efp (accessed: 30.05.2024).

Ivančík, R., & Jurčák, V. (2023). O výzvach Európskej únie z pohľadu vojenských operácií a misií vedených v rámci Spoločnej bezpečnostnej a obrannej politiky. *Vojenské reflexie*, *18*(1), 8–24. https://doi.org/10.52651/vr.a.2023.1.08-24

Ivančík, R. (2021). Aktuálne výzvy Spoločnej bezpečnostnej a obrannej politiky Európskej únie. *Almanach – aktuálne otázky svetovej ekonomiky a politiky*, *16*(1), 5–19.

Ivančík, R. (2022a). Security and defence policy of the European Union in the context of the conflict in Ukraine. *Medzinárodné vzťahy – Slovak Journal of International Relations*, *20*(4), 373–388. https://doi.org/10.53465/ SJIR.1339-2751.2022.4.373-388

Ivančík, R. (2022b). O strategickej autonómii a budúcnosti Európskej únie v Severoatlantickej aliancii. *Vojenské reflexie*, *17*(1), 43–60. https://doi.org/10.52651/vr.a.2022.1.43-60

Jurčák, V., & Ivančík, R. (2023). *Bezpečnostná a obranná politika Európskej únie: vysokoškolská učebnica*. Liptovský Mikuláš: Akadémia ozbrojených síl generála M.R. Štefánika. https://doi.org/10.52651/bopeu.b.2023.9788080406615

Knight, B. (2023). What happened to the German military's €100 billion fund? *Deutsche Welle*. https://www.dw.com/en/what-happened-to-the-german-militarys-100-billion-fund/a-64846571 (accessed: 30.05.2024).

NATO (2016). Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm (accessed: 30.05.2024).

NATO (2018). NATO and EU leaders sign joint declaration. *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_156759.htm (accessed: 30.05.2024).

NATO (2022). NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid 29 June 2022. *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf (accessed: 30.05.2024).

NATO (2023). NATO's military presence in the east of the Alliance. *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm (accessed: 30.05.2024).

Novaky, N. (2023). With the new Ukraine Mission, EU Military Training Becomes More Geopolitical. *Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies*. https://www.martenscentre.eu/blog/with-the-new-ukraine-mission-eu-military-training-becomes-more-geopolitical (accessed: 30.05.2024).

Ricard, P., Truc, O., & Wieder, T. (2022). Franco-German struggle over war in Ukraine raises EU foreign policy questions. *Le Monde*. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/05/20/the-franco-german-tandem-s-struggle-over-war-in-ukraine-raises-questions-for-eu-foreign-policy_5984115_4.html# (accessed: 29.05.2024).

Schmitz, R., Maynes, C., & Kakissis, J. (2023). Germany agrees to send its Leopard battle tanks to Ukraine after weeks of pressure. *NPR*. https://www.npr.org/2023/01/25/1150759498/germany-leopard-2-tanks-ukraine (accessed: 29.05.2024).

Zandee, D., Deen, B., Kruijver, K., & Stoetman, A. (2020). European strategic autonomy in security and defence. *Netherlands Institute of Interna-tional Relations*. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2020-12/Report_European_Strategic_Autonomy_December_2020.pdf (accessed: 29.05.2024).

Europejskie bezpieczeństwo i obrona w kontekście bieżących wydarzeń

STRESZCZENIE   Ciągłe pogarszanie się sytuacji w zakresie bezpieczeństwa globalnego i regionalnego, pogorszenie się sytuacji w zakresie bezpieczeństwa w bezpośrednim i dalszym sąsiedztwie terytorium Unii Europejskiej oraz wybuch konfliktu na Ukrainie wywołały w państwach członkowskich UE nieuniknione pytania dotyczące sposobu zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Chociaż żadne państwo członkowskie UE nie zostało zaatakowane militarnie, Ukraina – kraj partnerski UE, który ponadto sąsiaduje bezpośrednio z kilkoma państwami członkowskimi UE – została agresywnie zaatakowana przez Rosję, z naruszeniem prawa międzynarodowego, co de facto podważa stabilność Europy, a także europejski system bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Dlatego też autorzy artykułu zajmują się kwestią bezpieczeństwa i obrony europejskiej, aby wskazać, w jaki sposób rosyjska inwazja na Ukrainę wpłynęła na europejskie debaty dotyczące tego pilnego tematu. W tym kontekście skupiają się na wspólnej polityce bezpieczeństwa i obrony oraz tożsamości UE w zakresie bezpieczeństwa i obrony, na jej stosunkach z Sojuszem Północnoatlantyckim oraz przyszłych wyzwaniach związanych z bezpieczeństwem.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE   Unia Europejska, bezpieczeństwo, obrona, rozwój sytuacji, przyszłe wyzwania