Powerful enough to deter? Assessment of the expansion of the Polish Armed Forces from a geostrategic perspective
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.34767/SIIP.2024.01.08Keywords:
deterance, Polish Armed Forces, Poland’s military security, NATO, eastern flankAbstract
The main purpose of the article is to assess to what extent the planned expansion of the Polish Armed Forces will allow Poland to acquire the ability to militarily deter the Russian Federation. The conducted research aimed to obtain answers to two questions fundamental to Poland’s military security. Firstly, what are the basic conditions for effectively deterring the Russian Federation from open aggression against Poland? Secondly, to what extent the planned expansion of the Polish Armed Forces to 300,000 soldiers, is able to ensure Poland’s ability to deter Russia against full scale or limited aggression? The article uses research methods appropriate to the political science in particular the literature review and the critical analysis of sources. Poland’s military security is analysed in the broader context of geostrategic conditions and taking into account the new escalation ladder that has emerged in the hybrid cold war between Russia and NATO. Then, the expansion of the Polish Armed Forces was assessed from the perspective of Poland’s ability to militarily deter the Russian Federation. Three basic conditions for effectively deterring Russia against open aggression have been identified, i.e. having armed forces with appropriate potential, having “anti-surprise” capabilities, as well as NATO’s pursuit of a credible deterrence policy. However, some modernization plans and the idea of establishing a sixth division are at high risk of failure due to financial and personnel limitations. Moreover, the progressive degradation of personnel reserves in the event of mobilization seriously weakens the ability to deter full-scale aggression. There is a risk that, despite significant financial outlays, the development of the Polish Armed Forces will not lead to building the ability to deter the Russian Federation from open aggression.
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